Home Science and Society Space Melissa, violent but silent hurricane: why disasters don't talk

Melissa, violent but silent hurricane: why disasters don't talk


 
By Amos François

Executive summary

Hurricane Melissa, which struck Haiti in October 2025, illustrates a disturbing paradox: although the country was hit only indirectly, the human balance remains particularly heavy with 43 deaths. This tragedy reveals that natural disasters do not mechanically produce changes in public policies. Through Melissa's analysis, this article demonstrates that an extreme climate event remains « mute » as long as it is not carried by cause entrepreneurs capable of translating it into a public problem.

In the Haitian context, marked by deep institutional instability since the assassination of President Moses in 2021, the manufacture of climate policies faces major structural obstacles. The article thus proposes a renewed reading of disasters in small island developing States, articulating the political and policy dimensions in order to grasp the vulnerabilities inherited from a colonial past that still make public action conditional.
Keywords : Ouragan Melissa, Haiti, Extreme events, construction of public problems, Climate policy, framing.
 
Introduction

In several national contexts, extreme events have helped to highlight social and environmental vulnerabilities, in some cases leading to significant inflections in public policies. In the United States, Hurricane Katrina (2005) revealed structural social inequalities in exposure to environmental risks, particularly among the poorest African American communities, highlighting the limitations of disaster prevention and management policies (Tierney 2006). In Europe, the spectacular heat wave of 2003 helped to put the issue of caring for older people on the public agenda (Milet, 2005).

These episodes have fed a wealth of literature on the role of focusing events in the process of scheduling. Birkland (1997) shows that some disasters, by crystallizing public attention, can promote the emergence of new public policies. Academic work, notably by Kingdon (1995), Baumgartner and Jones (1993) and Cobb and Elder (1983), insists on opening windows of opportunity that these events can create, provided that they are interpreted, appropriate and carried by actors able to put them on the institutional agenda for a long time.

However, the majority of this research has been conducted in so-called developed countries. Few studies have focused on the dynamics of climate policy development and implementation in small island developing States, such as Haiti, which is regularly confronted with major disasters. This country is marked by a deep structural vulnerability, which should be analysed without ignoring the weight of its colonial past.

The objective of this article is to show that major disasters, like Hurricane Melissa, do not mechanically produce changes in public policies. They require the mobilisation of actors capable of translating them into public problems and public policies. The article thus proposes to analyse the social and political conditions in which an extreme climate event can or may not be seized as an opportunity to transform public action in the Haitian context.

Ouragan Melissa: What really is the name?

Hurricane Melissa is the 13th named storm, the 5th hurricane, the 4th major hurricane and the 3rd to reach category 5 on the Saffir-Simpson scale during the 2025 cyclonic season in the North Atlantic Ocean. It was formed from a tropical wave whose development was first observed on 15 October between West Africa and the Lesser Antilles.
On 28 October, Melissa crossed western Jamaica at its maximum intensity, causing significant damage due to severe winds, heavy rains and storm surges. As at 11 November, according to available data, at least 96 deaths were attributed to Melissa, 43 of which were related to floods and landslides in Haiti, and 48 to Jamaica.

Surprisingly, Haiti was only indirectly affected by Melissa. Yet the human balance remains particularly heavy. This situation speaks volumes about the depth of the country's structural vulnerability. Despite the number of deaths and the magnitude of the damage caused, Melissa, known as violent in the discourses circulating on social networks in Haiti, remains silent: she requires the intervention of actors able to make her speak, i.e. to translate its effects in terms of public problems and public policies.

How to make a hurricane talk?

The purpose of this section of the article is to highlight the central role of the scoping work carried out by actors capable of « Make it talk » Melissa. The transformation of extreme events into public policy concerns is not solely based on the objective gravity of the situation. For example, at least 450 homes have been damaged across the country. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), as at 31 October, nearly 14,000 people were accommodated and 2.3 million affected by the effects of Melissa. However, these figures, however alarming, alone are not sufficient to explain the inclusion of the event on the political agenda. This depends above all on the work of interpretation and framing carried out by cause contractors.

Indeed, catastrophic events such as Melissa, however destructive, do not trigger mechanically and systematically the development of public policies. Melissa does not speak: she is spoken. In other words, it requires the intervention of a cause entrepreneur, a true impresario capable of making her speak (Neveu, 2015, pp. 8-9). Their ability to capture public attention depends on framing, associations with beliefs and emotions that can reach a broad audience and/or actors with decision-making power in the field. Events must therefore be interpreted, constructed as problematic and put on the agenda by actors with defining power.

The literature has widely shown that scoping plays a crucial role in public policy changes, mobilizing collective beliefs and influencing both the discourse and the results of public action (Boin, 2009; Boin et al., 2009; McAdam, 2017; McEvoy et al., 2013). For example, the argument for political reform following a devastating storm in Sweden was set as a major challenge for the crisis response system (Nohrstedt and Parker, 2014). Similarly, Orlove et al. (2019) show that some glacial mountain communities are more involved in community scoping than climate scoping when discussing adaptation projects. In some contexts, the use of climate scoping to promote mitigation policies can even be seen as a form of exploitation of the suffering associated with the event (Boudet et al., 2019; Shepard et al., 2018).

It is thus clear that each disaster is produced and interpreted in a specific context. Not taking this into account would expose the researcher to the risk of producing an analysis « above ground ». That is why we propose to jointly and simultaneously understand the political and policy dimensions, in order to better understand the social and political conditions of the construction of public problems related to extreme weather events.

Political sphere and public policy sphere: two facets of the same medal

Since its independence in 1804, the Haitian state has been marked by recurrent socio-political instability. More recently, the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021 has accentuated an institutional situation already described as precarious. This event left a major institutional vacuum. The last general elections in Haiti date back to 2016, and there is currently no government resulting from an electoral process recognized as legitimate.
The interim executive branch (Transition Presidential Council, CPT), composed of nine members, is widely contested by the population. A significant part of civil society criticizes the role of the « international community » (the famous white in the Haitian popular discourse), accused of having supported and still supporting this new configuration of executive power. There is no legislative power. At the same time, the current government is struggling to hold elections, particularly because of the control exercised by armed groups, grouped under the name « Viv ansanm »on large portions of the territories of Port-au-Prince and Artibonite.

It is therefore clear that the current socio-political situation poses a significant challenge to the development of climate policies in Haiti in a post-disaster context. It affects, on the one hand, the country's ability to defend its interests in international climate arenas, with priority being given to internal security issues at the expense of climate issues, and Haitian representation in international negotiations remaining limited. On the other hand, these political instabilitys reduce the State's ability to seize the « opportunities » extreme weather events can sometimes open.

For example, during Hurricane Matthew's passage in October 2016, the government in place had as its priority the organization of elections. If it had been a fully legitimate government, its room for manoeuvre to create a more structural climate scoping would probably have been greater. All these contextual elements reconfigure the usual channels of representation, negotiation of Haitian interests and, more broadly, of manufacturing Haitian climate policies.

In reality, the analysis of the policy (i.e. the product of the state in terms of concrete action) climate Haitian cannot be dissociated from the politics (dimension of competition for political power, electoral game) contemporary Haitian. This articulation can be informed by the analysis of book policies in France, notably through the vote of the Lang law of 10 August 1981 on the single price of books. While the French context differs essentially from that of Haiti, the example is nevertheless enlightening to show how politicians can transform, or not, politicians, in the sense of public policies.

In the 1960s and 1970s, mobilizations emerged around the status of the book: for some actors, the book was not a product like the others; For others, it is a cultural industry. Two interpretative frameworks then oppose each other. A decade later, the reactivation of these mobilizations and the sustainable inclusion of cultural issues on the political agenda, particularly in the run-up to the 1981 presidential election, created the conditions for a change in book policies (Surel, 1997). The political alternation of 1981, with the arrival of the left in power, thus opens up a real political window, allowing the initiation of a formal legislative process.

By analogy, the current political situation in Haiti suggests unfavourable conditions for structured international climate negotiations and prioritization of environmental priorities. Budgets 2024-2025 and 2025-2026 « war budgets » As part of the fight against armed groups, this dynamic is illustrated by the fact that the budgetary resources allocated to environmental issues remain very limited.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Hurricane Melissa is not a problem in itself. The main challenge lies in the absence or lack of actors able to make her talk politically. As violent as she is, Melissa requires at least one spokesperson. « credible » to translate its effects into public problems and public policies. It would therefore be illusory to approach post-disaster issues in Haiti according to the same sequential or mechanical logics as those mobilized in Western countries. Rather, it is necessary to grasp the structural, inherited and contemporary vulnerabilities that make the construction of public climate problems and the manufacture of climate policies in a Caribbean and post-colonial context.

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Amos François
University of Geneva (Institute for Environmental Sciences)
Sciences Po Toulouse
State University of Haiti
amosfrancois1@gmail.com
amos.francois@etu.unige.ch